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Implications for Firm Cost
Abstract
This paper conducts a comprehensive study of the optimal exercise policy for an executive
stock option and its implications for option cost, average life, and alternative valuation concepts.
The paper is the rst to provide analytical results for an executive with general concave utility.
Wealthier or less risk-averse executives exercise later and create greater option cost. However,
option cost can decline with volatility. We show when there exists a single exercise boundary,
yet demonstrate the possibility of a split continuation region. We also show that, for CRRA
utility, the option cost does not converge to the Black-Scholes value as the correlation between
the stock and the market portfolio converges to one. We compare our model's option cost
with the modied Black-Scholes approximation typically used in practice, and show that the
approximation error can be large or small, positive or negative, depending on rm characteristics.
JEL classication: G11, G13, G30, G32
Keywords: Executive stock option; Option cost; Option life; Exercise policy; Dynamic trading1 Introduction
As options have become a major component of corporate compensation, investors have
become increasingly concerned about their cost to rms. The diculty is that this cost
depends on the exercise policies of option holders who face hedging constraints, so stan-
dard option theory does not apply. Indeed, evidence indicates that both executives and
other employees exercise options well before standard theory would predict.
This paper conducts a comprehensive study of the optimal exercise policy for an
executive stock option and its implications for option cost, average life, and alternative
valuation concepts. Our paper is the rst to provide analytical results on option cost,
average life, and the nature of the continuation region for an executive with general
concave utility. Working in a continuous-time framework, we give conditions under which
wealthier or less risk-averse executives exercise later and create greater option cost. We
prove that the continuation region is smaller the larger the dividend, and that when the
interest rate is zero, the continuation region shrinks as time elapses. However, exercise
policy is not monotonic in stock return volatility, and is nonmonotonic in time when
interest rates are nonzero. Option cost to shareholders can decline as volatility rises. We
show analytically when the exercise policy is completely characterized by a single stock
price boundary; we also demonstrate the possibility of a split continuation region, where
the executive exercises only at intermediate stock prices, but not at high or low prices.
When unconstrained trading of outside wealth in the market is possible, our numerical
examples with constant relative risk averse (CRRA) utility show how the exercise bound-
ary, option cost, and average life vary with the correlation between the stock return and
the market return. We also demonstrate that the option's exercise policy and cost to the
rm do not converge to their value-maximizing (Black-Scholes) counterparts as the corre-
lation goes to one; this result is in sharp contrast to the case with constant absolute risk
averse (CARA) utility. The presence of short-sale costs dampens the eect of correlation.
Recent accounting regulation requiring rms to recognize option expense has inten-
sied the demand for better valuation methods. Until better alternatives emerge, the
Financial Accounting Standards Boards (FASB) accepts the use of the Black-Scholes-
Merton formula with the option's contractual term replaced by its average life; this ap-
proximation is used by the vast majority of rms. We compare our model's option cost
with this approximate cost and show how the approximation error varies with the stock
beta, volatility, and dividend rate. We nd that the error can be large or small, positive or
1negative. Moreover, in some cases, the response of the FASB approximation to a change
in parameters is actually in the wrong direction.
Finally, we examine the option's value from the viewpoint of the executive. We prove
that the executive's subjective option value is decreasing in the dividend payout rate.
Our examples show how the subjective value discount from option cost varies with rm
characteristics. The magnitude of the discount suggests that the incentive benets of
option compensation must be large to oset its cost relative to cash compensation. Our
results are robust to the inclusion of restricted stock in the executive's portfolio.
Overall, our analysis underscores the importance of accurately characterizing the ex-
ercise policy for option valuation. As more data on exercises become available, it will be
possible to estimate an empirical option exercise and cancellation rate function, and thus
deduce option cost empirically. The results of this paper provide guidance about how
to specify and interpret models for estimating exercise rates and option cost, and yield
testable predictions about option exercise behavior. For example, our results suggest that
average option lives should be increasing in non-option wealth and in the dividend rate.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
presents the general model with optimal trading of outside wealth and analyzes the div-
idend eect. Section 4 analyzes the eects of risk aversion and wealth and characterizes
the shape of the exercise policy for a general utility function in the special case when out-
side wealth is invested risklessly. Section 5 studies the general case with optimal dynamic
trading of outside wealth assuming CRRA utility, shows how the correlation between the
underlying stock and the market aects exercise policy and option cost, and explains why
they do not converge to their value-maximizing counterparts as this correlation tends to
one. Section 6 shows how option average life and the FASB approximation error vary
with the stock beta, volatility, and dividend payout rate. Section 7 examines the option's
subjective value to the executive and shows how the subjective discount varies with the
stock price parameters. Section 8 considers the eect of holding restricted stock on option
cost. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2 Related literature
The intuition that the need for diversication can lead an executive to sacrice some
option value by exercising early is well understood in the literature, but explicit theory
of the optimal exercise of ESOs is still developing. Early papers establish the conceptual
2foundation for ESO valuation and explain the rationale for value-destroying early exercise.
In particular, Huddart (1994) and Marcus and Kulatilaka (1994) present binomial models
of the exercise decision and option cost with CRRA utility and outside wealth in the
riskless asset. Marcus and Kulatilaka (1994) include a positive risk premium on the stock
return, so the riskless investment of outside wealth is not optimal and this can create a
distortion in the exercise policy. Carpenter (1998) assumes outside wealth is invested in
the Merton (1971) stock-bond portfolio, but this is still not fully optimal in the presence
of the option. Detemple and Sundaresan (1999) study the case of simultaneous optimal-
exercise and portfolio-choice decisions and provide a characterization of the solution in
terms of certainty equivalents. Some recent papers use specic utility functions to focus
on the optimal partial exercise of options. These include Jain and Subramanian (2004),
Grasselli and Henderson (2009), and Rogers and Scheinkman (2007). None of these papers
contains either general analytical results on option cost or a comprehensive numerical
examination of policy and cost with dynamic trading of outside wealth.
Other recent papers have solved versions of the problem we describe here for the case
of CARA utility. Kadam, Lakner, and Srinivasan (2003) model the optimal exercise policy
for an innite-horizon option, but the model links the manager's consumption date to the
option exercise date, which can distort the exercise decision, even in the absence of trading
restrictions. Henderson (2007) also models the optimal exercise policy for an innite-
horizon real option and links the manager's consumption date to the option exercise date,
but uses a specialized utility function so that this link does not distort the exercise policy.
Leung and Sircar (2009) solve the nite-horizon problem, and include the risk of job
termination and the possibility of partial option exercise. Miao and Wang (2007) analyze
a similar problem in a real-options context with CARA utility and an underlying asset
that follows arithmetic Brownian motion. These papers obtain analytical results under
the assumption of CARA utility so that outside wealth is not a state variable. Our paper
allows for a more general utility specication and the study of wealth eects.
A number of papers value options using exogenous specications of the exercise policy.
Jennergren and N aslund (1993), Carr and Linetsky (2000), and Cvitani c, Wiener, and
Zapatero (2008) derive analytic formulas for option cost assuming exogenously specied
exercise boundaries and forfeiture rates. Hull and White (2004) propose a binomial model
in which exercise occurs when the stock price reaches an exogenously specied multiple
of the stock price and forfeiture occurs at an exogenous rate. Rubinstein (1995) and
Cuny and Jorion (1995) also compute option cost under exogenous assumptions about the
3timing of exercise. Given a specic exercise policy, these models are more computationally
tractable, but the accuracy of their approximation of option cost is as yet unknown and
they provide little insight about how option exercise policy should vary with option holder
and rm characteristics.
Finally, another literature focuses on option subjective value to the executive and its
discount from rm cost. Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) analyzes the case of
a European option. Hall and Murphy (2002) allow for early exercise but invest non-
option wealth in an exogenously specied portfolio of stock and bonds. Cai and Vijh
(2005) x outside wealth in the optimal constant-proportion portfolio. Ingersoll (2006)
develops an analytic subjective option valuation methodology assuming a CRRA executive
with a xed proportion of wealth in restricted stock, a marginal option position and an
optimal constant-barrier policy. In addition to our contributions to the literature on
optimal exercise and option cost, our paper augments this subjective value literature with
a comprehensive study of rm parameter eects in a model with optimal dynamic trading.
3 General framework
Options have become a signicant part of corporate compensation, now representing over
40% of compensation for top executives at large rms (see Frydman and Saks, 2007).
While option compensation is widely believed to create valuable performance benets,
rms, investors, and regulators are also increasingly concerned about its cost, since a
better understanding of option cost can help rms decide how to use options most e-
ciently. Options strengthen performance incentives mainly because option holders cannot
sell or fully hedge their options. In particular, options are explicitly nontransferable and
Section 16-c of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits corporate insiders from taking short
positions in their company's stock. However, these constraints on hedging mean that
standard American option valuation theory does not apply. Standard theory assumes the
option holders can trade freely and thus exercise according to a value-maximizing policy
(see, for example, Merton, 1973; Van Moerbeke, 1976; Roll, 1977; Geske, 1979; Whaley,
1981; Kim, 1990). By contrast, constrained option holders exercise options in potentially
value-destroying ways in order to diversify away some stock-specic risks.
The use of zero-cost collars and equity swaps by corporate insiders documented by
Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2001) suggests that insiders may have some scope for hedging
their incentive compensation. However, evidence that the vast majority of options are
4exercised well before expiration, even when no dividend is present, suggests that option
holders still face signicant hedging constraints (see Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon, 2005).
Although we refer to the option holder as an executive, our formulation of the problem
may apply equally well to lower-ranked employees. Non-insiders are not subject to Section
16-c short sales restrictions, but they may still nd shorting stock to be quite expensive.
Evidence of pervasive early exercise across all ranks, documented in Huddart and Lang
(1996) and Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2009), suggests that lower-ranked employees
also face signicant hedging constraints. This section lays out a general model of the
executive's optimal-exercise problem in the presence of hedging restrictions and denes
the resulting option cost to shareholders.
3.1 Executive's option exercise and portfolio choice problem
The executive has n nite-lived nontransferable options with strike price K and expiration
date T, and additional wealth W that he can invest subject to a prohibition on short
sales of the stock. The investment set includes riskless bonds with constant rate r, the
underlying stock with price St, and a market portfolio with price Mt. These prices satisfy
dSt
St
= (   )dt +  dBt; (1)
dMt
Mt
= dt + m dZt; (2)
where B and Z are standard Brownian motions with instantaneous correlation . The
stock return volatility, , the stock dividend rate, , and the mean and volatility of the
market return,  and m, are constant. The mean stock return, , is equal to the normal
return for the stock given its correlation with the market,
 = r + (   r); (3)
where  = =m. In particular, in the absence of the option, an optimal portfolio would
contain no stock position beyond what is implicitly included in the market portfolio.
The executive simultaneously chooses an option exercise time  and an outside wealth
investment strategy in the market and the stock, t  (m
t ;s
t). His goal is to maximize
5the expected utility of time T wealth, or equivalently:
max
ftvT;m;s0g
EfV (W

 + n(S   K)
+;)g; (4)
where tv is the option vesting date, W  denotes the outside wealth process under trading
strategy  given by
dW

t = rW

t dt + 
m
t ((   r)dt + m dZt) + 
s
t((   r)dt +  dBt): (5)
V is the indirect utility of freely investable wealth,
V (Wt;t)  max
m EtfU(WT)g s.t. dWu = rWu du + 
m
u ((   r)du + m dZu); (6)
and the utility function U is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously
dierentiable.
This formulation entails a number of simplications. The executive's portfolio does
not include a position in restricted shares of stock here, though Section 8 develops that
extension (see also Kahl, Liu, and Longsta, 2003; Ingersoll, 2006, for models of portfolio
choice with restricted stock). It allows only for a single block exercise of the option,
although the executive would probably prefer partial exercise. The model also considers
only a single grant of options when in practice, executives are granted new options every
year and typically build up large inventories of options with dierent strikes and expiration
dates. It would be useful to understand which options are most attractive to exercise rst
and how the anticipation of future grants of options and other forms of compensation
aects current exercise decisions. In addition, the model does not account for any control
the executive has over the underlying stock price process through the exertion of eort and
through project and leverage choices; these choices may interact with the exercise decision.
Finally, the model as outlined here does not incorporate the possibility of cancellation,
though we develop this extension in Section 6.2. Despite these simplications, we believe
this formulation captures the essence of the executive stock option problem.
3.2 Option cost to shareholders and executive's subjective value
The solution to the executive's optimal exercise problem, that is, the optimal exercise
policy , denes the option payo, (S   K)+ that occurs at time . The cost of the
6option to shareholders who can trade freely is the present value, or replication cost, of
that payo. This can be represented as the risk-neutral expectation of the risklessly
discounted option payo,
P = E
fe
 r(S   K)
+g; (7)
where E means expectation with respect to the probability measure under which the
expected returns on both the market and the stock are equal to the riskless rate.
Standard theory for tradable options assumes the option holder chooses the exercise
policy to maximize the option's present value, because when the option is tradable, max-
imizing present value is consistent with maximizing expected utility. When the option is
nontransferable these objectives are dierent, and the utility-maximizing payo typically
has a lower present value.
In addition, when the option is nontransferable, its present value or cost to shareholders
is dierent from its subjective value to the executive. We dene the subjective option value
as the amount of freely investable money that would give the executive the same utility
as the option, i.e., the value of x such that
V (W + x;t) = f(W;S;t); (8)
where V is the indirect-utility value of freely investable wealth as dened in Equation (6),
and f is the value function for the executive's problem with the options, dened formally
below. This denition is consistent with that in Kahl, Liu, and Longsta (2003) for the
subjective value of restricted stock. As Bergman and Jenter (2007) explain, in complete
markets, the subjective value must be less than the option cost to shareholders. The
discount in the executive's valuation of the option relative to its cost to shareholders
is part of the price shareholders pay for improved performance benets relative to cash
compensation. Section 7 shows how this discount varies with rm characteristics
3.3 Exercise policy and the eect of dividends
The cost of the executive stock option depends on the executive's exercise policy. In
the Markovian setting here, we can describe the exercise policy in terms of the so-called
continuation region of the executive, the set of states in which he continues to hold the
7option. Formally, the value function for the executive's problem is
f(Wt;St;t)  sup
ft_tvT;m;s0g
EtfV (W

 + n(S   K)
+;)g (9)
and the executive's continuation region is the set
D  f(w;s;t) : t < tv or f(w;s;t) > V (w + n(s   K)
+;t)g: (10)
The nature of the present-value-maximizing continuation region for an ordinary Amer-
ican option is well known (see, for example, Kim, 1990). There exists a critical stock price
boundary above which the option holder exercises and below which he waits. The bound-
ary is increasing in the stock return volatility and time to expiration and decreasing in
the dividend rate. For an executive stock option, some of these results may fail to hold.
However, the dividend eect is the essentially the same.
Proposition 1 The executive's continuation region is larger the smaller the dividend rate
on the stock.
Proof Suppose a given state (w;s;t) with t  tv is in the continuation region when the
dividend rate is 1 and let 2 < 1. Let f(w;s;t;) denote the value function and S
()
t
denote the stock price process when the dividend rate is . For every strategy  and ,
V (W

 + n(S
(2)
   K)
+;)  V (W

 + n(S
(1)
   K)
+;); (11)
where W  denotes the outside wealth process under trading strategy . This implies
sup
;
EtV (W

 + n(S
(2)
   K)
+;)  sup
;
EtV (W

 + n(S
(1)
   K)
+;); (12)
so
f(w;s;t;2)  f(w;s;t;1) > V (w + n(s   K)
+;t): (13)
Therefore, (w;s;t) is in the continuation region for 2.
Note that this result holds for a general utility function, regardless of the shape of the
continuation region or the existence of a critical stock boundary. Consistent with this,
Leung and Sircar (2009) nd the exercise boundary in the case of CARA utility declines
with the dividend rate. Numerical examples described later show that, like the value of
8ordinary options, executive option cost decreases in the dividend rate. The inequality
f(w;s;t;2)  f(w;s;t;1) above also implies the following:
Proposition 2 The executive's subjective option value is greater the smaller the dividend
rate on the stock.
4 Special case with no portfolio choice
The presence of the outside portfolio-choice problem signicantly complicates the analysis,
and our remaining results for this general case are numerical. Before turning to these, we
develop additional analytical results for the special case in which there is no market asset,
and the executive simply invests outside wealth in riskless bonds. We also eliminate the
risk premium on the stock because otherwise the executive could have a spurious incentive
to hold the option in order to earn the risk premium. Thus, we consider the case in which
the stock appreciates at the riskless rate,
dSt
St
= (r   )dt +  dBt; (14)
and there is no other risky asset available. After the executive exercises the options, his
optimal portfolio contains only riskless bonds, so
V (Wt;t) = U(Wte
r(T t)): (15)
The executive's problem at each time t < T then becomes
f(St;t)  max
ft_tvTg
EtfU(n(S   K)
+e
r(T ) + W)g; (16)
where the constant W is outside wealth at time T, and f : (0;1)  [0;T] ! R is a
continuous function.
In the continuation region,
D = f(s;t) 2 (0;1)  [0;T] : t < tv or f(s;t) > U(n(s   K)
+e
r(T t) + W)g; (17)
f(S;t) satises E(df) = 0. If f is C2;1 then, by Ito's Lemma, it satises the p.d.e.
ft +
1
2

2S
2fSS + (r   )SfS = 0: (18)
9To calculate f numerically, simultaneously determining the optimal exercise policy, we
solve Equation (18) backwards using an implicit nite-dierence method, similar to valu-
ing an ordinary American option (see Appendix A). The market value, or cost, of the
option, P(S;t), solves the usual Black-Scholes equation,
Pt +
1
2

2S
2PSS + (r   )SPS   rP = 0;
subject to the exercise policy determined in solving for f.
4.1 Existence of a single stock price boundary
This section explores whether a single stock price boundary  s(t) separates the continuation
region below from the exercise region above, as is the case for ordinary American calls.
This is often assumed to be true in executive stock option models with exogenously
specied exercise policies. However, we show that the utility-maximizing policy need not
have this structure and provide conditions under which it does.
To formalize intuition about the various eects of waiting to exercise, let g(s;t) 
U(n(s   K)+er(T t) + W) denote the payo function for the optimal stopping problem
and note that on (K;1)[0;T], g is C2;1 and It^ o's lemma implies that g has drift equal
to H(St;t) where
H(s;t)  U
0(h(s;t))(rK   s)ne
r(T t) +
1
2
U
00(h(s;t))n
2e
2r(T t)
2s
2 (19)
and h(s;t)  n(s   K)er(T t) + W is total time T wealth given exercise at time t and
stock price s. This expression shows that when the option is in the money, the eects of
waiting to exercise include the benets of delaying payment of the strike price, the cost
of losing dividends, and the cost of bearing stock price risk.
Proposition 3 Suppose that W > nKerT and that H is nonincreasing in the stock price
s. For each time t 2 [tv;T), if there is any stock price at which exercise is optimal, then
there exists a critical stock price  s(t) such that it is optimal to exercise the option if and
only if St   s(t).
Proof Fix t 2 [tv;T). Suppose (s1;t) is a continuation point. We show that if s2 < s1
then (s2;t) is also a continuation point. First note that it must be optimal to continue
holding the option if St  K. Stopping then would guarantee a reward of U(W), which
10is less than the expected utility of continuing, for example, until the rst time the stock
price rises to K + c, for some c > 0, or until expiration T.
So assume s1 > s2 > K. For u  t, let S(i)
u denote the stock price process starting
from si at time t and note that S(1)
u > S(2)
u . Finally, let  be the optimal stopping time
given St = s1. Since  is a feasible strategy if St = s2,
f(s2;t)   f(s1;t)  EtfU(n(S
(2)
   K)
+e
r(T ) + W)   U(n(S
(1)
   K)
+e
r(T ) + W)g
 EtfU(n(S
(2)
   K)e
r(T ) + W)   U(n(S
(1)
   K)e
r(T ) + W)g
= g(s2;t)   g(s1;t) + Et
Z 
t
(H(S
(2)
u ;u)   H(S
(1)
u ;u))du
 g(s2;t)   g(s1;t): (20)
Therefore, f(s2;t)   g(s2;t)  f(s1;t)   g(s1;t) > 0.
The hypothesis is satised for CRRA utility functions with relative risk aversion less
than or equal to one and suciently large wealth. Similarly, in the value-maximization
problem for an ordinary option, the second-order term in H does not appear, and it
follows that it is optimal to exercise if and only if the stock price is above a critical level.
For executive stock options however, the risk aversion of the option holder gives rise to
the second-order term, and the drift need no longer be monotonic in the stock price.
Example with a split continuation region Figure 1 shows the optimal exercise policy
for utility function
U(W) =
W 1 A
1   A
+ cW (21)
with A = 10;c = 0:0001;S0 = K = 1;tv = 5;T = 10;r = 0:05; = 30%; and  = 0. As
the gure shows, the executive exercises the option for intermediate stock prices, but does
not exercise at either high or low stock prices. The intuition for this is that as the stock
price grows large, the executive feels wealthier, the concave part of his utility becomes
small relative to the risk neutral part, he starts to act like a cost maximizer, and refrains
from exercising because the dividend rate is zero. With a positive dividend rate, there
would also be another exercise region, above the upper continuation region, extending to
innity. In this example, if we ignore the presence of the upper continuation region, the
option cost is 0.408 instead of the correct value of 0.432.
114.2 Risk aversion, wealth, and volatility eects
This section describes how exercise policy and option cost change with risk aversion,
wealth, and stock return volatility.
4.2.1 Monotonicity with respect to risk aversion and wealth
Intuition suggests that less risk-averse managers are likely to exercise later, and conse-
quently the cost of their options is greater. Similarly, one would expect that managers
with decreasing absolute risk aversion will exercise later, implying greater option cost, if
they have more non-option wealth. The following results verify this intuition and hold
regardless of the actual shape of the continuation region:
Proposition 4 An executive with less absolute risk aversion has a larger continuation
region.
Proof If U1 and U2 are utility functions and U2 has everywhere less absolute risk aversion
than U1, then by Theorem 5 on page 40 of Ingersoll (1987),
U2(W) = G(U1(W)); (22)
where the function G satises G0 > 0 and G00 > 0. Now suppose a given state (s;t) with
t  tv is in the continuation region for the problem with utility U1. Let  be the optimal
stopping time for U1. Let fi(s;t) and gi(s;t) denote the value and payo functions for the
problem with utility Ui, i = 1;2. Since  is feasible for the problem with U2,
f2(s;t)   g2(s;t)  EtfU2(n(S   K)
+e
r(T ) + W)g   U2(n(St   K)
+e
r(T t) + W)
= EtfG(U1(n(S   K)
+e
r(T ) + W))g   G(U1(n(St   K)
+e
r(T t) + W))
 G(EtfU1(n(S   K)
+e
r(T ) + W)g)   G(U1(n(St   K)
+e
r(T t) + W))
= G(f1(s;t))   G(g1(s;t)) > 0:
Therefore, (s;t) is also in the continuation region for U2.
Similarly, in the CARA models of Henderson (2007), Miao and Wang (2007), and
Leung and Sircar (2009), the exercise boundary declines with the level of risk aversion.
Corollary 1 If the executive has decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the continuation
region is larger with greater wealth.
12Proof Let W2 > W1 and note that U(w + W2   W1) = G(U(w)) for some function G
satisfying G0 > 0 and G00 > 0.
Note that when the stock price process is the same, but the continuation region is
larger, the realized time to exercise or expiration is greater, and thus the option's expected
life is greater. This leads to the following two corollaries:
Corollary 2 The expected life of the option is greater if the executive has less absolute
risk aversion.
Corollary 3 If the executive has decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the expected life
of the option is greater if the executive is wealthier.
This yields the testable prediction that the options of wealthier executives have longer
average lives.
Proposition 5 If the dividend is zero, option cost is greater if the executive has less
absolute risk aversion.
Proof Suppose U1 and U2 are utility functions and U2 has everywhere less absolute risk
aversion than U1. For i = 1;2, let i be the optimal stopping time for the executive with
utility Ui and let Pi be the resulting option cost. Finally, let
p(s;t)  e
 rt(s   k): (23)
By Proposition 4, 2  1, so
P2   P1 = Efp(S2;2)
+   p(S1;1)
+g (24)
= Ef(p(S2;2)
+   p(S1;1))1f1<Tgg (25)
 Ef(p(S2;2)   p(S1;1))1f1<Tgg (26)
= Ef
Z 2
1
e
 rt(rK dt + St dBt)1f1<Tgg (27)
= EfE1f
Z 2
1
e
 rt(rK dt + St dBt)g1f1<Tgg  0: (28)
Corollary 4 If the executive has decreasing absolute risk aversion and the dividend is
zero, then option cost is greater with greater wealth.
13Proof From Corollary 1, the optimal stopping time for an executive with greater wealth
is later. The rest follows like the proof of Proposition 5.
In numerical examples with CRRA utility, option cost decreases in risk aversion and
increases in wealth with a positive dividend as well. All of the examples described in
this section are generated using an implicit nite-dierence method to solve the partial
dierential equations describing the executive value function and option cost. Even in
examples in which the coecient of relative risk aversion, A, is greater than one, or
wealth is small, the continuation region is characterized by a single stock price boundary.
In addition, the minimum wealth condition in Proposition 3, used only in the proof to
ensure that the arguments of the utility function remain nonnegative, does not appear to
be necessary in the numerical examples.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate these eects with plots of exercise boundaries and option
cost for various levels of risk aversion and wealth. On the left, the exercise boundary for
each level of risk aversion is a plot of the critical stock price  s(t) versus time t. On the
right, the option cost, labeled \ESO cost," determined by the dierent boundaries are
plotted against the level of risk aversion. Shown for comparison, the option value labeled
\Max value" is the value of the option under the usual present-value-maximizing policy.
In all of the gures, the options are at the money with ten years to expiration, the number
of options and initial stock price are normalized to one, and the riskless rate is 5%. Other
parameter values in Figures 2 and 3 are varied around a base case in which the executive
has CRRA coecient 2 and initial wealth 1.2, and the stock has zero risk premium, 3%
dividend, and 50% volatility.
As indicated by Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 the exercise boundaries fall with risk
aversion and rise with wealth. In addition, in the numerical examples, option cost falls
with risk aversion and rises with wealth, even with a positive dividend, suggesting that
though our proof of Proposition 5 uses the zero dividend condition, it is probably not
necessary. The examples also suggest that as risk aversion grows large, or as outside
wealth goes to zero, the boundary falls to S = K and option cost falls to zero (or the
value of a European option that expires on the vesting date). The intuition for this is
that as risk aversion grows large, the risk premium required to trade a certain exercise
value for a risky continuation value goes to innity. On the other hand, as risk aversion
goes to zero, or as wealth grows large, option cost converges to its maximized value.
144.2.2 Nonmonotonicity with respect to stock return volatility and time
A basic result in standard option pricing theory is that option value is increasing in
volatility. This is also typically the case in executive stock option models with an ex-
ogenously specied exercise boundary (see, for example, Cvitani c, Wiener, and Zapatero,
2008). However, the utility-maximizing continuation region can shrink considerably with
volatility and this can lead to option cost actually declining in volatility.
The risk-averse utility of the option payo, as a function of the stock price, has both a
convex region and a concave region, so in principle, an increase in volatility could either
lead the executive to continue longer or exercise sooner. Figure 4 illustrates these eects
with plots of the exercise boundaries and option cost for various levels of stock return
volatility. The executive has CRRA coecient 2 and initial wealth 1.2 and the stock has
zero risk premium and zero dividend. As volatility rises from 10% to 200%, the exercise
boundary tends to fall rst, but can then rise slightly, especially at intermediate values
of t. This is shown most clearly in Figure 4A, with risk aversion coecient A = 2. The
initial drop in the boundary as volatility increases is perhaps best understood by starting
with the case  = 0. In this case, if the dividend rate is less than the interest rate, it is
never optimal to exercise early, that is, the boundary is innite.1 So starting at  = 0,
the boundary has to decline with volatility.
The subsequent slight rise in the boundary as volatility increases from a high level is
in line with the theory for traded options. It may occur because when the option is in the
money, low-volatility variation in the stock price remains in the concave portion of the
utility payo function, while high-volatility variation reaches across the convex portion,
so higher volatility may be needed to tap the convexity eects of the option payo from
standard theory. In the real-option models of Henderson (2007) and Miao and Wang
(2007) with CARA utility, the investment threshold is monotone in volatility, but the
direction depends on the parameters. Empirically, Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005)
nd that insider options are exercised earlier at higher-volatility rms.
Executive stock option cost can also be nonmonotonic in volatility. At lower levels
of risk aversion, as shown in Figure 4A, option cost is generally increasing in volatility.
However, at higher levels of risk aversion, as shown in Figures 4B and 4C, option cost is
decreasing in volatility at low levels of . Here the negative eect on cost of the drop in the
boundary osets the positive eect of extreme stock prices becoming more likely. Other
1Indeed, Huddart and Lang (1996) nd that at one of their sample rms with only 4% volatility,
employees wait almost until expiration to exercise their options.
15papers, such as Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991), Ross (2004), Henderson (2007),
and Miao and Wang (2007), have shown that the option's private value to the holder can
decline with volatility. Ours is the rst well-posed analysis to show that the option's cost
to shareholders can also decline with volatility. In all cases, the gap between the ESO
cost and the maximized option value widens as volatility increases. Consistent with this,
Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005) nd empirically that the fraction of maximized option
value that insiders realize at exercise declines with rm volatility.
Figure 4 also shows that in some cases, especially when volatility is high, the utility-
maximizing exercise boundary may not decline monotonically in time (by contrast, the
value-maximizing boundary always declines as expiration approaches). To understand
this, consider rst the following proposition, which indicates that when the interest rate
is zero, the set of stock prices at which continuation is optimal shrinks as time t elapses;
in particular, if there is a critical boundary, it declines monotonically in time.
Proposition 6 Suppose r = 0. Fix stock price s > 0, let tv  t1 < t2, and suppose it
is optimal for the executive to continue with the option at (s;t2). Then it is optimal to
continue at (s;t1).
Proof For t  tv, write the executive's value function as
f(s;t;T)  max
ftTg
EtfU(n(se
 (+2=2)( t)+(B() B(t))   K)
+ + W)g; (29)
and note that
f(s;t;T) = f(s;tv;T   (t   tv)) : (30)
Next, note that if T1 < T2, then f(s;tv;T1)  f(s;tv;T2) since any  feasible for the
problem with horizon T1 is feasible for the problem with horizon T2. Therefore,
f(s;t1;T) = f(s;tv;T   (t1   tv)) (31)
 f(s;tv;T   (t2   tv)) (32)
= f(s;t2;T) (33)
> U(n(s   K)
+ + W) ; (34)
so it is optimal to continue at (s;t1).2
2Leung and Sircar (2009) have a similar result for the CARA case.
16This result indicates that the nonmonotonicity of the boundary in time must stem
from the presence of a positive interest rate. To gain some intuition for this, note that the
value of continuing can be viewed as the in-the-money drift H of the utility payo function
(from equation (19)) plus the time value, or \put" value, of retaining the option not to
exercise if the stock price falls below the strike price.3 This put value of continuing, which
is increasing in volatility and decreasing in time, is weighed against the cost of bearing
more risk, which is summarized by the second-order \risk-aversion" term in H. That risk
aversion term is increasing in volatility and may be decreasing in time when the interest
rate is positive, the eect being greater at higher volatility. So the net eect of the passage
of time may be to discourage exercise for high volatility and positive interest rates.
On the other hand, in the limit as time approaches the expiration date, the exercise
decision merely hinges on the sign of H. In the CRRA case, at t = T there is a single
positive stock price, S, above which H is negative and below which H is positive. The
limit of the exercise boundary as t ! T is then max(S;K). When the dividend rate is
zero this limit is decreasing in volatility, and for high volatility it is equal to the strike
price, as Figure 4 shows.
5 General case with outside portfolio choice
This section examines the general problem with nontrivial outside-portfolio optimization,
described in Section 3. Existing models of optimal exercise with an outside portfolio-
choice problem, such as Cai and Vijh (2005), Henderson (2007), and Leung and Sircar
(2009), either restrict the portfolio to constant proportions, or else assume CARA utility
so that the exercise decision does not depend on wealth. By contrast, we assume CRRA
utility for our numerical examples and allow for dynamic trading, so the value function f,
the exercise decision, and the optimal outside-portfolio weights depend on both the stock
price and outside wealth. In the continuation region, if f is suciently smooth and the
portfolio weight in the market, m=W, lies in a compact set, then f(W;S;t) satises the
3Formally, the evolution of the utility payo g(St;t) = U(n(St   k)+er(T t) + W) is
dg(St;t) = 1fSt>KgH(St;t)dt + 1fSt>KgU0(h(St;t))ner(T t)St dBt + U0(W)ner(T t) dt(K);
where t(K) is the local time of the process S at the level K up to time t (see Karatzas and Shreve (1991)
and Carr, Jarrow, and Myneni (1992)). This local time term captures the notion of the \put value" of
continuing, described above.
17Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation,
max
m ft + fW [rW + 
m(   r)] + SfS(   ) +
1
2
fWW(
m)
2
2
m (35)
+
1
2
S
2fSS
2 + SfWS
mm = 0:
The option's market value, P(W;S;t) satises the p.d.e.
Pt + WrPW + SPS(r   ) +
1
2
PWW(
m)
2
2
m (36)
+
1
2
S
2PSS
2 + SPWS
mm   rP = 0;
subject to the exercise policy determined in solving for f. We solve Equations (35)
and (36) simultaneously, using a locally one-dimensional implicit nite-dierence method
(see Appendix B).
Unreported results suggest that the wealth, risk aversion, and volatility eects from
the previous section still hold in the presence of optimal trading in a market portfolio
with a nonzero risk premium and correlation with the stock return. In particular, option
cost is still increasing with executive wealth, decreasing with executive risk aversion, and
nonmonotonic with respect to stock return volatility. In addition, the optimal exercise
policy appears to be characterized by a critical stock price for each possible date and
wealth level, above which it is optimal to exercise and below which it is optimal to con-
tinue. We also note that, when the market risk premium and the stock return correlation
with the market are set to zero, the results are the same as those from the one-factor
model of the last section. The remainder of this section focuses on the dependence of
the exercise policy and option cost on the correlation between the stock return and the
market return. Numerical examples in Figure 5 vary correlation around a base case in
which the executive has CRRA coecient 2 and initial wealth 1.2, the market has 20%
volatility, and the stock has 50% volatility, zero dividend, and normal expected return
given its correlation with the market. While some of the correlation eects are like those
in the CARA case, others are very dierent.
5.1 Correlation eects with zero risk premium
The usual intuition from portfolio theory suggests that when the market risk premium
   r is zero, the only reason to hold a market position in the outside portfolio is to
18hedge the option position. Furthermore, all that should matter for the option exercise
policy and cost is the magnitude of the correlation, , not its sign, since that is what
determines how much stock risk can be hedged away. Figure 5A conrms this intuition.
Exercise boundaries and option cost for a given value of  are the same as for  . To ease
comparison with the previous section, the gures show exercise boundaries across time
for wealth equal to its initial value. Also consistent with intuition, Figure 5A shows that
option cost and exercise boundaries increase with jj, as more and more of the option risk
can be hedged away.
Limiting behavior as jj ! 1: A surprising result from Figure 5A is that in the limit,
as jj goes to one, the exercise boundaries and option cost remain strictly below their
value-maximizing levels. With perfect correlation between the stock and the market, the
executive can perfectly hedge the option, so there is no reason for a value-destroying early
exercise, and the option cost is its maximized value (the Black-Scholes value in this case,
indicated by the solid line in the right-hand plot of Figure 5A). However, this is not the
limit of the option cost as  ! 1. With anything less than perfect correlation, the
basis risk in the hedge requires the executive to keep outside wealth positive, in order
to avoid a possibly tiny, but still positive, probability that the option nishes out of the
money while outside wealth remains nonpositive, which CRRA utility cannot tolerate.
Therefore, in the limit as jj ! 1, the executive is essentially solving the problem with
perfect correlation, but also with a nonnegativity constraint on outside wealth. This
bounds expected utility away from its unconstrained value and thus leaves open the
possibility that value-destroying early exercise is optimal, as we now show by analytically
solving the special case where correlation is perfect and the option is European.
If the executive is constrained to keep outside wealth nonnegative, then, using the mar-
tingale approach of Karatzas, Lehoczky, and Shreve (1987) and Cox and Huang (1989),
his problem can be written in the form
max
WT
EU(WT + (ST   K)
+) s.t. EfTWTg  W0 and WT  0 ; (37)
where T is the stochastic discount factor
T = e
 rT BT  1
22T ; (38)
19 is the Sharpe ratio
 =
   r
m
; (39)
the terminal stock price is
ST = S0e
( )T+BT  1
22T ; (40)
and  = r + 
m(   r) is the normal mean stock return. Here the correlation between
the stock and the market is plus or minus one, according to the sign of . The optimal
outside-portfolio payo is
W

T = [U
0 1(T)   (ST   K)
+]
+ ; (41)
where  is the value of the Lagrange multiplier that makes the martingale budget con-
straint in problem (37) hold with equality, i.e.,
EfT[U
0 1(T)   (ST   K)
+]
+g = W0 : (42)
The executive's optimal total terminal wealth with the option is W 
T + (ST   K)+. For
U(W) = W1 A
1 A , U
0 1(y) = y 1=A.
Note that the optimal total payo in the unconstrained Merton problem without the
option is of the form (T) 1=A, or equivalently aW0S
T , where a is a positive scalar and
 =

A is the constant optimal proportion of wealth that would be invested in the
stock if the investor could trade freely in the stock and riskless bonds. In other words,
optimal terminal wealth is a power function of ST. If the power   1 and the total
present value of outside wealth and option wealth is suciently high, then outside wealth
minus the option wealth, aW0S
T   (ST   K)+, will be positive for all values of ST, in
which case the nonnegativity constraint in problem (37) will be nonbinding and perfect
hedging of the option will be possible. Otherwise, the constraint will bind for high values
of ST, and the executive will bear some unwanted option risk. For example, with zero
risk premium,  = 0 and the optimal unconstrained payo is a constant (generated by
holding only riskless bonds). Perfect hedging would require negative outside wealth in
high stock price states, so the nonnegativity constraint on outside wealth makes perfect
hedging impossible. Similarly, in our examples with  = 13%, r = 5%, and m = 20%, the
Sharpe ratio is  = 0:4, so with risk aversion coecient A = 2 and stock return volatility
50%, the optimal portfolio weight in the stock in the unconstrained Merton problem is
 = 0:4. Because this is less than 1, it does not generate a payo large enough to absorb
20the option payo in high stock price states without violating the nonnegativity constraint.
When perfect hedging is not possible, there is the possibility that value-destroying
early option exercise, which removes the hedging constraint, may be preferable to contin-
uing with the option. We nd numerically that, at a suciently high intermediate-date
stock price, the expected utility of holding the European option to expiration (given the
nonnegativity constraint) is less than the expected utility of exercising the option immedi-
ately and investing all wealth in the optimal unconstrained portfolio. For example, with a
zero risk premium, A = 2, K = 1, T = 10, r = 5%,  = 50%, and  = 0, at t = 6 (so there
are 4 years until expiration), St = 3 and Wt = 1:2, the expected utility from the European
option with the nonnegativity constraint above is  0:3022, while the expected utility from
exercising immediately and investing all wealth in bonds is  0:2559.4 Therefore, for an
otherwise identical American option, holding to expiration is not optimal (even though
the dividend is zero), and the cost of the option is strictly less than its maximized value.
This result contrasts sharply with limiting behavior in CARA models such as Henderson
(2007). There, the optimal exercise policy converges to the value-maximizing policy as
jj ! 1, and the option cost converges to its maximized value.
5.2 Correlation eects with a positive risk premium
When the market risk premium is positive, exercise boundaries and option cost are no
longer necessarily symmetric in , as Figure 5B illustrates. To understand this, recall
that with less than perfect correlation between the stock and the market, the basis risk in
hedging the option acts as a nonnegativity constraint on outside wealth. This means that
not all of the market risk inherent in the option position can be hedged. Next, recall that
the risk premium on the stock is equal to its normal level, i.e., the stock's market beta
times the market risk premium. Therefore, when correlation is positive, the unhedged
market risk in the option position carries a positive risk premium, while the unhedged
market component of the option risk carries a negative risk premium when the correlation
is negative. This means that for the same magnitude of correlation, holding the option is
more attractive in the case of positive correlation than in the case of negative correlation.
Consistent with this explanation, we nd that with a positive market risk premium,
4The continuation value is calculated by numerical integration, using Maple, i. to determine the value
of the Lagrange multiplier, , from Equation (42); and then ii. to calculate the expected utility of total
terminal wealth in problem (37). The expected utility obtained closely matches the expected utility
calculated by our nite-dierence solution to Equation (35) when jj = 0:99 and the option is European.
21expected utility in problem (37) above is higher when  = 1 than when  =  1. Since
expected utility is lower when correlation is negative, the utility value of exercising im-
mediately, which does not depend on the correlation, will exceed the expected utility of
the European option in more states of the world. For example, with A = 2, K = 1,
T = 10,  = 13%, r = 5%, m = 20%, jj = 50%, and  = 0, at t = 6, St = 1:75 and
Wt = 1:2, the expected utility from problem (37) is  0:3203 when  = 1 and  0:3995
when  =  1, while the expected utility from exercising immediately and investing all
wealth in the optimal unconstrained Merton portfolio is  0:3578, regardless of the sign
of .5 So when the option is American, it will be exercised sooner, and its cost will hence
be lower, with negative correlation than with positive correlation.6 By contrast, in the
CARA model of Henderson (2007), the exercise policy depends only on the magnitude of
the correlation, not the sign.
Our results of i. nonconvergence to value-maximization as correlation goes to one,
and ii. asymmetry in the sign of correlation, go beyond CRRA and are likely to hold
more generally if there is a nonnegativity constraint on outside wealth. In particular,
regardless of preferences and no matter how high the correlation between the option and
tradable assets, if the option holder cannot use the option as collateral against which to
take short positions, then perfect hedging may not be possible and the option cost might
be bounded away from its maximized value. In other words, even without a prohibition
on short selling stock (as in the case of non-insider employees), a lower bound on outside
wealth may reduce option cost.
5.3 Correlation eects with costly short sales
The presence of costly short selling can produce an osetting asymmetric correlation eect.
That is, short sales costs dampen the increase in option cost with respect to correlation
when correlation is positive. Suppose the executive incurs a proportional cost  per
unit time whenever he shorts the market. Then the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
5Again, the continuation values are calculated by numerical integration, and again the expected utili-
ties obtained closely match those calculated by our nite-dierence solution when  = 0:99 or  0:99 and
the option is European.
6Leung and Sircar (2009) nd the opposite asymmetry, that is, for the same magnitude, the exercise
boundary is higher with negative correlation than with positive correlation. This is because they hold
the mean return on the stock xed as they vary correlation, so the stock has an abnormal return with
respect to the hedging instrument, which is larger the smaller, or more negative, the correlation. This
means that for correlation of given magnitude, the unhedged option risk in their model is more attractive
when correlation is negative than when it is positive.
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m ft + fW [rW + 
m(   r + 1m<0)] + SfS(   ) +
1
2
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2
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+
1
2
S
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mm = 0:
The short sale cost impedes hedging only when the correlation is positive and large enough
to adjust the natural long market position so far downward that the option holder would
like to hold an overall negative position. Figure 5C illustrates the eect of costly short-
ing for the case with low outside wealth and risk aversion, and either zero market risk
premium (on the left) or positive market risk premium (on the right). In both cases,
the eect is to reduce the executive's willingness to hold the option, and consequently to
reduce option cost, whenever the correlation is suciently high. The eect is weaker with
a positive market risk premium than with zero market risk premium because higher cor-
relation is accompanied by a higher expected stock return, which creates a larger natural
long position to absorb the hedge. Indeed, with zero risk premium, option cost remains
constant at its zero correlation level once the short cost becomes high enough that hedging
ceases to take place. With a positive risk premium, the eect of costly shorting is very
slight. This is consistent with Jenter (2002), who nds that short-sale constraints are
not relevant at reasonable wealth levels in a model of the incentive eects of stock-based
compensation which also allows the manager to trade a market asset.
6 The FASB approximation
In December 2004, the FASB issued SFAS 123(R), which requires rms to recognize op-
tion cost in earnings. The new standard requires rms to estimate option cost according
to \established principles of nancial economic theory" when market prices are unavail-
able. However, recognizing that full-blown estimation methods are still only beginning to
develop, the FASB illustrates a variety of acceptable methods for approximating option
cost, which include lattice methods and a modied Black-Scholes-Merton formula. The
vast majority of rms use the latter method, which entails rst estimating the option's
expected term, conditional on vesting, and then valuing the option at its Black-Scholes-
Merton value using the option's expected term in place of its contractual term. This
amount is then multiplied by the probability that the option vests, and later updated
to reect the actual number of pre-vesting forfeitures. Equilar (2007) nds that 88% of
23Fortune 1000 rms used this method in 2006.
To gain a better understanding of the properties of the FASB approximation, consider
two polar cases, one in which the approximation error is always negative, and one in which
it is always positive. In the rst case, there is a positive dividend rate, and the option
is exercised according to the value-maximizing policy of standard theory. Then the true
option cost must be greater than the option cost approximated using any deterministic
expiration date, so the FASB approximation will understate cost. For example, a 10-year
at-the-money option on a stock with a 3% dividend rate and a 30% volatility will cost 0.34
per dollar of underlying stock, assuming a 5% riskless rate. If the expected stock return
is 13%, then the expected life of the option is 7.9 years, so the FASB approximation,
that is, the value of a European at-the-money option on the same underlying stock with
expiration in 7.9 years, is only 0.30, understating the true cost.
In the second polar case, the exercise or cancellation time is random, and independent
of the stock price (or any other priced risk). In this case, the true option cost is the average
of Black-Scholes values over the distribution of possible stopping times. Since the Black-
Scholes value for at-the-money call options is generally concave in time to expiration,
the true cost will be less than the Black-Scholes value of the average expiration date by
Jensen's inequality. For example, consider an option on the same stock as above, but
suppose it is only ever stopped through exercise or cancellation (depending on whether it
is in or out of the money) at an exogenous termination rate of 12% per year. Then the true
option cost will be 0.24, the expected life will be 5.8 years, and the FASB approximation
will be 0.27, overstating the true cost. Based on this reasoning, Huddart and Lang (1996)
argue that the FASB's methodology overstates option cost, but this is not always true.
In practice, executives voluntarily exercise options in ways that may depart more or less
from value-maximization, and also experience employment termination, much of which
occurs exogenously, so the approximation error could be either positive or negative. To
see how the FASB approximation compares with true ESO cost in our setting, we compute
the expected option term implied by the exercise policy of the executive in our model,
and then calculate the FASB approximation.7 Since, in our model, the executive neither
maximizes value nor exercises and cancels purely randomly, it is not clear ex ante whether
we should expect the FASB errors to be positive or negative, and, indeed, we nd that
the approximation error can go either way.
7The expectation of the option's term is under the true probability measure (as would be estimated
using historical data on realized option lives, according to FASB guidelines).
246.1 Baseline model with no employment termination
Table 1 examines the performance of the FASB approximation using the pure utility-
maximizing model developed so far. The table presents expected terms, ESO cost, FASB
approximations, and approximation errors, for a variety of parametrizations of the model.
We start with two dierent base-case parametrizations. The rst is for a rm with high
volatility, high beta, and low dividend rate, which might be typical of a young rm or
a technology rm. The second is for a lower volatility, lower beta, higher dividend rm,
such as a more seasoned rm in the industrial sector. Then we alternately vary the beta,
the volatility, and the dividend rate of the base-case rms, to show dierent eects in the
cross-section. Throughout the examples, the riskless rate is 5%, the expected return on
the market portfolio is 13%, and the volatility of the market return is 20%. The option
vests at year 2 and expires at year 10. The executive has CRRA coecient 4 and outside
wealth 0.6 times the grant date value of shares under option. This gives the options
expected terms of about 5 years in the base cases, which is the average expected term
used by Fortune 1000 rms from 2004 to 2006, according to Equilar (2007).
In the rst base case, the true option cost is 0.45 and the FASB approximation is 0.50,
overstating by 10%. In the second base case, the true cost is 0.29, while the approximation
is 0.26, understating by 9%. The utility-maximizing policy is closer to maximizing value
at the higher dividend rate and lower volatility of the second base case,8 which helps
to explain why the second base case has a negative approximation error, while that in
the rst base case is actually positive. Indeed, the maximized value of the option in the
second base case is 0.34, only 20% higher than the ESO cost. In the rst base case, the
maximized value is 0.67, 49% higher than the ESO cost.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the eect of increasing the stock's beta. This is equivalent
to increasing its correlation with the market, since volatility is held constant in this panel.
As explained in Section 5, increasing this correlation improves the executive's ability to
hedge option risk, which raises the exercise boundary and increases the ESO cost, as Panel
A shows. However, there are conicting eects on the option's expected term. On the
one hand, raising the boundary should increase the expected term, for a given expected
stock return. On the other hand, when beta increases, the expected stock return rises
commensurately, which reduces the time to reach a given boundary. For the rst base
8This makes intuitive sense. With dividends, the value-maximizing exercise policy has the same form
as the utility-maximizing policy: exercise when the stock price hits some boundary. With no dividend,
the value-maximizing policy is always to wait until expiration, a completely dierent form.
25case, the latter eect dominates, and option expected life and the FASB approximation
decline as beta rises, moving in the opposite direction to the true ESO cost. In the second
case, the expected term is U-shaped in beta, but the approximation error still decreases
in algebraic value monotonically.
Panels B and C of Table 1 show the eects of changing stock return volatility. Panel B
shows the eect with beta held constant, in which case only the idiosyncratic component of
the stock risk is varying. Panel C shows the eect with correlation held constant, in which
case the idiosyncratic and hedgeable components of risk are held in constant proportion,
such as in the case of an increase in leverage. Like the examples from Section 4, the ESO
cost is either increasing or U-shaped in volatility, as is the FASB approximation. However,
the FASB approximation rises faster with volatility, so the approximation error tends to
increase in algebraic value. Given the intuition from the polar cases described above, this
may partly be understood by noting that ESO cost falls away from its maximized value
as volatility increases, as shown in Figure 4.
The eect is less pronounced in Panel C for two reasons. First, in Panel C, some of
the increase in risk is an increase in hedgeable risk, which has a positive eect on the
exercise boundary and ESO cost because of the convexity of the option payo, without
the corresponding negative eect of increased net risk exposure. Second, in the FASB
approximation in Panel C, there is the negative eect of increasing beta which increases the
stock's expected return and reduces the option's expected term. Thus the approximation
error increases more slowly in Panel C than in Panel B.
Panel D of Table 1 shows dividend eects. Both ESO cost and FASB approximations
decline as the dividend increases. However, expected option term actually increases with
a higher dividend rate because this reduces the appreciation rate of the stock, which
therefore takes longer to reach the exercise region. In the low end of the dividend range,
the FASB value declines faster than the ESO cost, which actually grows as a proportion of
its maximized value, so the approximation error decreases. As the dividend grows large,
all values converge to zero.
Finally, Panel E illustrates wealth eects. Both ESO cost and FASB approximations
increase with executive wealth, but the ESO cost, which approaches its maximized value,
increases faster. Therefore, the approximation error decreases with wealth and even be-
comes negative. This is especially apparent in the second base case, with a positive
dividend. The ESO cost converges to the maximized value of 0.34, which is greater than
the value assuming any deterministic stopping date, such as the expected term. By con-
26trast, the corresponding FASB approximation is only 0.30. The eects of decreasing risk
aversion, not reported, are qualitatively similar.
6.2 Model with employment termination
In the baseline model, early exercise results only from motives of diversication and div-
idend capture. In practice, employees can also be forced to exercise an in-the-money
vested option, forfeit an unvested option, or cancel an out-of-the-money vested option, if
employment terminates. We therefore here study the eect of adding exogenous termina-
tion to the utility-maximizing exercise model. In this case, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation describing the executive's value function becomes
max
m ft + fW [rW + 
m(   r)] + SfS(   ) +
1
2
fWW(
m)
2
2
m +
1
2
S
2fSS
2 (44)
+ SfWS
mm + 

V

W + n(S   K)
+;t

  f

= 0;
where  is the hazard rate governing exogenous termination. As a check on our calcula-
tions, we reproduce the option values and expected option terms in Table 1 of Carr and
Linetsky (2000), which assumes exercise and cancellation at an exogenous rate. Other
papers that incorporate employment termination risk in option valuation include Jenner-
gren and N aslund (1993), Carpenter (1998), Cvitani c, Wiener, and Zapatero (2008), and
Leung and Sircar (2009).
In Section 6.1 above, which assumed no employment termination, we needed to set the
executive's outside wealth very low, 0.6 times the value of shares under option, to bring
the option's expected term down to the empirically observed average of 5 years. However,
if we introduce employment termination at a hazard rate of 12% per year (consistent with
Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2009)), we obtain an expected term of 5 years in the
base cases with a more realistic wealth level of 4 times the value of shares under option.
Table 2 illustrates termination rate eects, as well as other parameter eects in the
presence of a 12% termination rate. Note that, for the same expected term of 5 years,
option cost is lower with the positive termination rate, even though wealth and the vol-
untary exercise boundary are higher. In particular, option cost is now 0.38 in base case 1
and 0.22 in base case 2, compared with 0.45 in base case 1 and 0.29 in base case 2 in the
last section with only voluntary, utility-maximizing exercise.
To understand the termination rate eects in Panel A of Table 2, note that, in a model
27with only exogenous termination and no voluntary early exercise, the FASB approxima-
tion error will be positive because of the Jensen's inequality eect described above. It
will also be hump-shaped with respect to the termination rate, because the variance of
the stopping time goes to zero as either i. the termination rate goes to zero and so the
stopping time converges to the option expiration date, or ii. the termination rate goes
to innity, in which case the stopping time converges to the vesting date. The variance
of the stopping time, and thus the Jensen's inequality eect, is highest for intermedi-
ate termination rates. In Table 2, there is both exogenous termination and voluntary
utility-maximizing early exercise. In Panel A, we see the hump-shaped termination rate
eect in the FASB approximation error in base case 1. However, in base case 2, where
the base case FASB error is negative (because the utility-maximizing policy is closer to
value-maximizing), the eect of increasing dispersion and the eect of the stopping time
converging to the vesting date, which pushes the approximation error to zero, go in the
same direction, and the approximation is monotonically increasing to zero.
The beta and dividend rate eects on the approximation error in Panels B and E are
qualitatively the same as in the baseline case in Table 1, though somewhat dampened
by the presence of the exogenous termination. The approximation error is still generally
monotonically increasing in volatility in base case 2, as it was in Table 1, but is a U-shaped
function of volatility in base case 1, and close to zero.
In Table 1, FASB errors were monotonically increasing in volatility. This is also true
in Table 2, at least for volatilities 30% and higher. However, the FASB errors decrease in
Panel C (and, to a lesser extent, D) when volatility increases from 25% to 30%. This is
related to the accompanying sharp drop in the option's expected term. When volatility
is 25%, there is much more time for exogenous termination to have an eect, so this case
looks more like the purely random polar case studied above, where the Jensen's inequality
eect pushed the FASB approximation above the true value. As volatility increases from
25% to 30%, the expected term drops sharply, so this eect is reduced, causing the FASB
error to fall. As volatility continues to rise, it causes much smaller changes in expected
term, and the relation with volatility looks more like that in Table 1.
The eects shown here assume the executive follows the exercise policy of our model.
Analyzing the FASB approximation errors that occur in practice requires knowing the
actual exercise policies of executives, from which both correct option cost and expected
option terms could be estimated. Overall, Tables 1 and 2 suggest that FASB approxima-
tion errors can be small or large, positive or negative, depending on the rm prole.
287 The subjective option value discount
The focus of the paper is on the cost of the option to the rm, that is, the present
value of the option payo from the viewpoint of market participants who can trade freely.
However, we can also use our framework to study the subjective value of the option from
the viewpoint of the executive who cannot trade the option. The subjective option value
is the amount of freely investable money that would give the executive the same utility
as the option, as dened in Equation (8).
As Bergman and Jenter (2007) note, as long as the executive is free to buy the option
in the open market, either explicitly or synthetically, the option's subjective value cannot
exceed its present value. If the executive were given an amount of cash equal to the
option's present value, the executive could always buy the option in the open market,
so the executive could get at least as much utility as with the option itself. Therefore,
the executive would need no more than the present value of the option, in the form of
freely investable cash, to be as well o as with the option. Violations of this inequality
can arise if the executive is prevented from taking long stock or option positions in his
outside portfolio, as Cai and Vijh (2005) show, but this inequality will certainly hold in
the complete markets setting here.
In Table 3 we use our model to quantify subjective option values and their discounts
from present value for the same parametrizations shown in Table 1. The discount is
dened as one minus the ratio of subjective value to present value. Panel A shows that, like
present values, subjective option values increase with beta or correlation, and the discount
declines. Intuitively, better hedging opportunities narrow the gap as the executive can
eectively monetize more and more of the option's value. Henderson (2007) and Leung
and Sircar (2009) nd similar eects in CARA models and Kahl, Liu, and Longsta (2003)
nd a similar eect in the subjective value of restricted stock.
In Panel B, subjective option values are monotonically decreasing, and the discount
is increasing, as the executive is exposed to more and more idiosyncratic risk. This is
similar to the idiosyncratic risk eects in Kahl, Liu, and Longsta (2003) and Henderson
(2005). In Panel C, where correlation is held constant, subjective option value does not
vary monotonically with volatility in the second base case. In this panel, in addition
to the apparently negative eect of the increase in idiosyncratic risk, there is also the
positive eect of an increase in market risk, which essentially increases the value of the
tradable component of the option payo. Henderson (2005) nds a similar eect with a
29European option. In the second base case, this positive eect dominates at low volatility.
The positive eect also operates on the exercise boundary and the option cost, however,
and the subjective value discount remains increasing in volatility.
Panel D illustrates dividend eects. Proposition 2 established that increasing the
dividend rate reduces the subjective option value. Panel D shows that in addition, the
subjective discount is roughly constant at the low end of the dividend range. However,
as the dividend grows large, both option cost and subjective value go to zero, and the
discount appears to go to zero as the option becomes a trivial component of wealth.
The dierence between the cost of the option to the rm and its subjective value to
the employee is part of the cost of extracting better performance. It is the agency cost of
the inecient risk allocation necessary to elicit unobservable or noncontractible eort. In
addition to this, there is the cost of compensating the executive for the extra eort, which
must be paid even if the eort is contractible and the extra compensation can be paid in
cash. The results in Table 3 suggest that the total cost of eliciting better performance
may be quite high. On the other hand, evidence of positive stock price reactions to
announcements of the adoption of an option plan in Brickley, Bhagat, and Lease (1985),
DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990), Kato, Lemmon, Luo, and Schallheim (2005) and
Langmann (2007) suggests that the market perceives the benets to outweigh the costs.
8 The case with restricted stock
Since 2004, when the FASB issued a new standard requiring rms to recognize option
cost in earnings, rms have increased their use of restricted stock as compensation. Chi
and Johnson (2007) nd that the share of compensation paid to executives in the form
of restricted stock at S&P 500 rms rose monotonically from 4% in 1992 to 15% in 2005.
Over the same period, the share of executive compensation paid in the form of options,
as measured by Black-Scholes value, rose from 31% to 34%, with a peak of 65% in 2001.
To investigate the eects of restricted stock on option cost, we consider the case in
which the executive's outside portfolio contains a xed number of shares that vest on the
option expiration date, in addition to wealth that the executive can trade dynamically
in the market and riskless bonds. This does not change the Bellman equation for the
problem, but it alters the boundary condition upon option exercise. As a check on our
calculations, we reproduce the subjective option values in Table 1 of Lambert, Larcker,
and Verrecchia (1991) by setting the correlation between the stock and the market to
30zero, so that outside wealth is invested risklessly.
As Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) note, adding restricted stock can, in
principle, have conicting eects: a wealth eect that could increase option cost, and
the eect of increasing the executive's exposure to stock risk, which could reduce option
cost. We nd that the second eect dominates, that is, adding restricted stock reduces
option cost and average option life. Table 4 reports option cost and expected terms in the
presence of restricted stock, using as a base case 0.3 shares of restricted stock and with
outside wealth increased from 0.6 times the value of shares under option in the base case
without restricted stock, to 0.95, in order to restore average option life to ve years. The
remaining base case parameter values match those of base case 1 in Tables 1 and 2.
Panel A of Table 4 shows that in the base case, option cost is 47% of the value of
the underlying shares with no restricted stock, and falls to 39% as the restricted stock
position grows large. The FASB approximation declines as the option average life falls
with restricted stock, but not as fast as the option cost, so the approximation error
increases. Option subjective value decreases with the size of the restricted stock holding
and the subjective discount increases dramatically.
We nd the remaining parameter eects are both qualitatively and quantitatively the
same as in the case with no restricted stock. In fact, the numbers in Panels B through
E of Table 4 are remarkably similar to those in Panels A through D of Tables 1 and 3,
which assume no restricted stock but less outside wealth. We conclude that our previous
results are robust to the inclusion of restricted stock.
In addition to holding restricted stock, executives typically have considerable invest-
ments of human capital in their rm. This rm-specic human capital represents another
nondiversiable component of the executive's total portfolio, which may be highly cor-
related with the rm's stock price. As such, like restricted stock, it should increase the
executive's desire for diversication and thus promote earlier option exercise and lower
option cost. This would further explain why our calibrated outside wealth level is so low.
9 Summary and conclusions
This paper advances the theory of executive stock option valuation with an in-depth
study of the optimal exercise policy of a risk-averse executive and its implications for
option cost. Many recent valuation models for executive stock options set the exercise
policy exogenously, assuming a single stock price boundary. This paper provides a simple
31example showing that the optimal exercise policy need not be of that form. However, we
provide a sucient condition for the existence of a single boundary when riskless bonds
are the only investment available and the stock underlying the option appreciates at
the riskless rate. This condition is satised by CRRA utility functions with risk aversion
coecient less than or equal to one, and we nd no counterexamples among our numerical
results for CRRA utility functions with risk aversion coecient greater than one.
We also prove that, for general concave utility, the executive exercises later and option
cost is greater when he has less absolute risk aversion, or more wealth combined with
decreasing absolute risk aversion. The exercise region is also larger, and subjective option
value to the executive is greater, the lower the dividend rate on the stock. Finally,
if the interest rate is zero, the continuation region shrinks as time elapses. All these
monotonicity results hold regardless of the exact shape of the continuation region.
Numerical examples with CRRA utility show how the exercise boundary and option
cost vary with volatility. In contrast to results from standard option theory, or from
executive stock option valuation models with a xed exercise boundary, executive stock
option cost can decline in stock return volatility when increases in volatility cause the
optimal exercise boundary to drop suciently.
Next, we show numerically how exercise boundaries, option cost, and option average
life vary with stock beta, volatility, correlation with the market, and dividend rates when
trading outside wealth in the market is possible. The exercise boundary, option cost, and
average life all increase with the magnitude of the correlation between the stock return
and the market return. However, for CRRA utility, the option's exercise policy and cost
to the rm do not converge to their maximized (Black-Scholes) values as the correlation
between the stock and the market tends to one. When the market risk premium and stock
beta are both nonnegative, increasing the stock beta increases option cost and average
life. Option cost declines with the dividend payout rate, but average life actually increases
because of the lower stock appreciation rate.
Finally, we examine the widely used approximation to option cost that is accepted by
the FASB and nd the approximation error can be small or large, positive or negative,
depending on the rm's beta, volatility, and dividend rate. In addition, the subjective
option value from the executive's viewpoint can be no greater than the option cost to
shareholders, and we show how the subjective discount varies with rm prole. Our
results suggest that the cost of providing performance incentives is high, and we conclude
that the performance benets must be quite signicant.
32A Numerical methods: one-factor model (Section 4)
In Section 4, the value function, f(S;t) satises the one-factor partial dierential equation
ft +
1
2

2S
2fSS + (r   )SfS = 0: (18)
To solve for f numerically, we rst take a log transform of Equation (18).9 Dening
s  log(S) and g(s;t)  f(S;t), the derivatives of f can be written as
ft = gt;
fS =
gs
S
;
fSS =
gss   gs
S2 :
Substituting into Equation (18), we obtain
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
gs = 0: (45)
which we can write in the form
@g
@t
+ Lsg = 0; (46)
where the operator Ls is dened by
Ls 
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
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:
We solve this p.d.e. numerically on a grid of s and t values using a nite-dierence method,
where the derivatives in Equation (45) are approximated using dierences between neigh-
boring values of g on the grid.10 First, dene the grid values as
gj;k  g(sj;tk)  g(s + j s;k t);
9This transformation simplies numerical analysis by making the coecients in the equation constant
(see, for example, Brennan and Schwartz (1978), Geske and Shastri (1985), or Hull and White (1990)).
10Good general overviews of nite-dierence methods include Ames (1992) and Lapidus and Pinder
(1982); overviews focusing on asset-pricing applications include Tavella and Randall (2000) and Duy
(2006).
33where s is the smallest value of s in the grid, and s and t are the grid spacings in the
s and t directions respectively. Now approximate the time derivative, gt, as
gt 
1
t
(gj;k+1   gj;k); (47)
and the s derivatives (at period k) via
gss 
1
s2 (gj+1;k   2gj;k + gj 1;k); (48)
gs 
1
2s
(gj+1;k   gj 1;k); (49)
and dene the operator Ls, the nite-dierence approximation to Ls, as
Ls gj;k 
2
2s2 (gj+1;k   2gj;k + gj 1;k) +

r      1
22

2s
(gj+1;k   gj 1;k): (50)
Approximating Ls in Equation (46) using the (known) values at date k + 1 leads to the
explicit nite-dierence approximation,
gj;k = (1 + tLs)gj;k+1: (51)
Alternatively, approximating Ls using the (as yet unknown) values at date k leads to the
implicit nite-dierence approximation,
(1   tLs)gj;k = gj;k+1: (52)
As in Kahl et al. (2003), we use the implicit method, which has signicant stability advan-
tages (see, for example, Brennan and Schwartz (1978)). The \computational molecule"
for this method is shown in Figure 6. This system of equations can be written (after
imposing upper and lower boundary conditions at j = 0 and j = nj) in matrix form as
Vgk = gk+1; (53)
where V is tridiagonal. Such equations can be solved very eciently (see, for example,
Ames (1992)). Starting with the terminal values,
gj;nk = U

n(Sj   K)
+ + W

;
34we now calculate the value function for every s and t value, simultaneously determining
the optimal exercise policy, much as we value an American option. For each date in turn,
k = nk   1;nk   2;:::;0,
1. Solve Equation (53) to calculate the value of g at date k, assuming no exercise.
2. For each Sj, also calculate the value function conditional on exercising,
U

n(Sj   K)
+e
r(T tk) + W

:
3. Replace g with the exercise value of the option whenever this is higher.
B Numerical methods: two-factor model (Section 5)
In Section 5, the value function, f(W;S;t), satises the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion,
max
m

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= 0:
As with the one-factor model above, we solve this problem using a nite-dierence method,
similar to Brennan, Schwartz, and Lagnado (1997), and especially Kahl, Liu, and Longsta
(2003). Again, we start by taking a log transform. Letting s  log(S);w  log(W); 
m=W, and g(w;s;t)  f(W;S;t), Equation (35) becomes11
max


gt + gw
h
r + (   r)   1=2
2
2
m
i
+ gs(     
1
2

2) (54)
+
1
2
gww
2
2
m +
1
2
gss
2 + gwsm

= 0:
11Note that the investment fraction, , is well-dened because an investor with CRRA utility will never
allow outside wealth to go to zero.
35Assuming fWW < 0 (or, equivalently, that gww   gw < 0), the optimal portfolio position
 is obtained by solving the rst order condition for :12
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Substituting back into Equation (54), we obtain the (nonlinear) p.d.e.
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Rewrite this, analogous to Equation (46) above, in the form
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+ (Lw + Ls + Lws)g = 0; (57)
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:
To solve this equation using nite-dierence methods, rst dene the values of g on a
grid of w, s and t values, analogous to Appendix A above, as
gi;j;k  g(wi;sj;tk)  g(w + iw;s + j s;k t):
Following Kahl et al. (2003), we linearize Equation (57) by evaluating  at each time t
and state (w;s) using the estimated values of the function g and its derivatives at time
t+t. As in the one-factor case above, we approximate Lw and Ls using nite-dierence
12For some parameter values, at very small wealth levels the value function, f, is convex in W, a
possibility noted in Henderson and Hobson (2008). In this case, the solution given by Equation (55) is
a minimum, rather than a maximum; the true solution is unbounded (Henderson and Hobson (2008)
show that it is actually optimal for the agent to take an instantaneous large gamble in such a state), so
we set  = max, for some (nite) value max, the sign being the opposite of the right hand side of
Equation (55). In practice, we obtain virtually the same values this way as when we use Equation (55)
regardless of the sign of fWW, suggesting that this potential nonconcavity is not playing a big role.
36operators, Lw and Ls dened analogously to Equation (50) above, and approximating Lws
using the operator
Lws gi;j;k 
m
4ws
(gi+1;j+1;k   gi+1;j 1;k   gi 1;j+1;k + gi 1;j 1;k): (58)
This leads to a nite-dierence approximation to Equation (57), analogous to the one-
factor Equation (52),
(1   t[Lw + Ls])gi;j;k = (1 + tLws)gi;j;k+1; (59)
where we have used implicit approximations to Lw and Ls on the left, and an explicit
approximation to Lws on the right. Writing this as a matrix equation relating gk to gk+1,
as we did in the one-factor case, we obtain an equation which is sparse, but no longer
tridiagonal, so it cannot easily be solved directly. Brennan et al. (1997) use successive
over-relaxation to solve their version of this equation iteratively (see Tavella and Randall
(2000) for a description). However, this technique is known to converge slowly as the
number of grid points becomes large. Instead, we use a splitting method to turn the
two-dimensional problem into a sequence of one-dimensional problems, each of which can
be solved as in the one-factor case above.13 This method involves approximating the left
hand side of Equation (59) as
(1   t[Lw + Ls])gi;j;k  (1   tLw)(1   tLs)gi;j;k: (60)
This approximation introduces an error of order t2, the same as that of the nite-
dierence approximation to gt in Equation (47), so the overall order of the error is un-
changed when we substitute into Equation (59) to obtain
(1   tLw)(1   tLs)gi;j;k = (1 + tLws)gi;j;k+1: (61)
This can be solved in two one-dimensional steps. Dening the ctitious \intermediate"
13Splitting methods, also known as \locally one dimensional" (LOD) methods, or the \method of
fractional steps," were primarily developed in Russia in the 1960s (see, in particular, Yanenko (1971),
Marchuk (1990), and, for a discussion of their use in nancial applications, Duy (2006)). They are
closely related to Alternating Direction Implicit (ADI) methods (see, for example, Douglas and Rachford
(1956) and Peaceman and Rachford (1955)). Note that handling the mixed derivative explicitly does not
interfere with stability, unlike with classical ADI (see Yanenko (1971)).
37value,
gi;j;k+ 1
2  (1   tLs)gi;j;k;
rst solve, for each j = 0;1;:::;nj, the (tridiagonal) system of equations
(1   tLw)gi;j;k+ 1
2 = (1 + tLws)gi;j;k+1; (62)
to obtain the intermediate values, gi;j;k+ 1
2. Next, for each k = 0;1;:::;nk, solve the
tridiagonal system of equations,
(1   tLs)gi;j;k = gi;j;k+ 1
2; (63)
to calculate gi;j;k. The mechanics of solving for g are now very similar to the one-factor
case. Starting with the terminal values, gi;j;nk = U (n(Sj   K)+ + Wi), for each date in
turn, k = nk   1;nk   2;:::;0,
1. Solve Equations (62) and (63) to calculate the value of g at date k, assuming no
exercise.
2. For each Wi and Sj, also calculate the value function conditional on exercising,
which standard dynamic programming methods (see, for example, Merton (1969))
show to be given by14
V (W;tk) =
e
(1 A)

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( r)2
2A2
m

(T tk)
W 1 A
1   A
; where (64)
W = n(Sj   K)
+ + Wi:
3. Replace g with the exercise value of the option whenever this is higher.
Robustness Although our solution technique is similar to methods already in the lit-
erature, including Brennan et al. (1997) and Kahl et al. (2003), we performed various
robustness checks to assure ourselves that the results obtained were reasonable. In par-
ticular: (1) We also calculated values using an explicit nite-dierence algorithm, which
does not require the linearization step because all derivatives with respect to w and s are
evaluated at (known) date t+t. The results are virtually identical to those obtained us-
ing the implicit method; (2) In the case where the number of options equals zero (n = 0),
14In practice, we solve for V numerically using the same grid as for g, to ensure that any biases
introduced by our numerical procedure aect both values roughly equally.
38our numerical method gives results for both the value function and the optimal invest-
ment amount that are very close to their true, closed-form, values (see Equation (64)); (3)
Using the same method to value a European call option, the value converges nicely to the
Black and Scholes (1973) value; (4) We experimented with dierent numbers of w, s and
t values in the grid, with little eect on our results; (5) We tried various boundary condi-
tions, including imposing linearity at the boundary (see Tavella and Randall (2000)), and
imposing a quadratic functional form at the boundary, with little eect on the solution.
Intuitively (see Tavella (2002, page 237)), as long as the boundaries are a long way from
the region in the middle of the grid that we are interested in, the exact choice of boundary
condition is not very important.
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45Fig. 1.  Exercise policy with split continuation region.  Executive has utility U(W)=W^(1-A)/(1-A)+cW with A=10 and c = 0.0001, 
and initial wealth 1.2.  Executive follows optimal exercise policy and invests outside wealth risklessly.  Option is at the money, vests 
in 5 years, and expires in 10 years.  Riskless rate is 5%.  Stock has zero risk premium, zero dividend rate, and 30% volatility.  Initial 
stock price is 1.  
Date: 6.000000
Start exercise at S = 1.465828
Stop  exercise at S = 1.683112
Start exercise at S = 10000.000000
Date: 5.000000
Start exercise at S = 1.506916
Stop  exercise at S = 1.622202
Start exercise at S = 10000.000000
Date: 4.000000
Start exercise at S = 10000.000000
Date: 3.000000
Start exercise at S = 10000.000000
Fig. 2.  Exercise boundaries and option cost for various levels of risk aversion.  Executive has CRRA utility, initial wealth 1.2, 
follows optimal option exercise policy, and invests outside wealth risklessly.  Option is at the money, vested, and expires in 10 years.  
Riskless rate is 5%.  Stock has zero risk premium, 50% volatility, and 3% dividend rate.  Initial stock price is 1.  
Cert. equ. (one barrier)  =       0.2162458
Mkt. value (maximizing J) =       0.4324916
Mkt. value (maximizing V) =       0.5257043
Mkt. value (one barrier)  =       0.4081062
FASB value                =       0.5256679
Time elapsed =   0 days,  0 hours,  0 minutes, 10 seconds
Fig. 3.  Exercise boundaries and option cost for various levels of initial wealth.  Executive has CRRA coefficient 2, follows optimal 
option exercise policy, and invests outside wealth risklessly.  Option is at the money, vested, and expires in 10 years.  Riskless rate 
is 5%.  Stock has zero risk premium, 50% volatility, and 3% dividend rate.  Initial stock price is 1.  
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Fig. 4.  Exercise boundaries and option cost for various levels of stock volatility.  Executive has CRRA utility, initial wealth 1.2, 
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Riskless rate is 5%.  Stock has zero risk premium, 50% volatility, and 3% dividend rate.  Initial stock price is 1.  
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52Table 4
Option values in the presence of restricted stock
   Executive has restricted stock and options, follows optimal option exercise policy, and 
optimally invests outside wealth in market portfolio.  Executive has CRRA coefficient 4, initial 
outside wealth 0.95 times the value of shares under option, and 0.3 shares of restricted stock in the 
base case.  Option is at the money, vests in 2 years, and expires in 10 years.  Risk free rate is 5%.  
Market portfolio return has mean 13% and volatility 20%.  In the base case, the stock has 
volatility 50%, beta 1.2, and zero dividend.  Initial stock price is 1.  
Changing  Expected ESO FASB Approx Percent Subj. Subj.
Parameter Term Cost Approx Error Error Value Discount
Panel A: Restricted Stock Effects
0 5.35 0.473 0.512 0.039 8% 0.246 48%
0.15 5.13 0.457 0.502 0.045 10% 0.203 56%
0.3 5.01 0.450 0.497 0.047 10% 0.186 59%
1 4.79 0.431 0.486 0.055 13% 0.144 66%
2 4.64 0.418 0.478 0.060 14% 0.118 72%
5 4.47 0.404 0.470 0.066 16% 0.087 79%
10 4.38 0.396 0.465 0.069 18% 0.072 82%
Panel B: Beta Effects
0.0 6.00 0.425 0.540 0.115 27% 0.149 65%
0.5 5.53 0.429 0.520 0.091 21% 0.156 64%
0.9 5.21 0.436 0.506 0.069 16% 0.170 61%
1.2 5.01 0.450 0.497 0.047 10% 0.186 59%
1.4 4.95 0.456 0.494 0.038 8% 0.201 56%
Panel C: Volatility Effects Holding Beta Constant
25% 7.48 0.463 0.413 -0.050 -11% 0.408 12%
30% 5.33 0.423 0.373 -0.050 -12% 0.285 33%
40% 4.81 0.417 0.420 0.003 1% 0.213 49%
50% 5.02 0.449 0.497 0.048 11% 0.183 59%
60% 5.34 0.488 0.576 0.087 18% 0.165 66%
Panel D. Volatility Effects Holding Correlation Constant
25% 5.10 0.337 0.329 -0.008 -2% 0.198 41%
30% 4.94 0.356 0.357 0.001 0% 0.194 45%
40% 4.91 0.402 0.425 0.023 6% 0.189 53%
50% 5.02 0.449 0.497 0.048 11% 0.183 59%
60% 5.21 0.496 0.570 0.074 15% 0.177 64%
Panel E. Dividend Rate Effects
0% 5.01 0.450 0.497 0.047 10% 0.186 59%
3% 5.28 0.390 0.396 0.007 2% 0.164 58%
10% 5.91 0.273 0.209 -0.064 -23% 0.122 55%
50% 9.08 0.024 0.000 -0.024 -100% 0.022 7%
53